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INTRODUCTION 
Many North Carolina politicians refer to the entirety of the state by 
saying “from Manteo to Murphy.”1 Manteo, North Carolina, is a small 
 
 *  © 2019 Matthew L. Farley. 
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beach town on Roanoke Island on the eastern edge of the state, while 
Murphy, North Carolina, is a similarly sized town in Cherokee County, the 
state’s westernmost county. Including Manteo and Murphy, North Carolina 
is home to 552 municipalities.2 They range in size from Charlotte, with 
over seven hundred thousand people, to Fontana Dam, with a population of 
less than twenty-five.3 Together, these 552 towns4 are home to just over 
fifty percent of the state’s entire population of 10.7 million.5 
However, the unincorporated areas of North Carolina’s one hundred 
counties (“from Dare to Cherokee”) are home to almost as many people.6 
The people living in unincorporated areas of North Carolina’s counties are 
almost as dependent on the neighboring municipalities as those who live 
inside the town boundaries.7 Non-municipal residents travel to incorporated 
municipalities to work, receive government services, purchase essentials, or 
seek out entertainment.8 
Some even view the area just outside of town limits as the most 
desirable place to live.9 Such locations offer the conveniences of a town 
while allowing residents to maintain a rural lifestyle and avoid higher 
municipal taxes.10 Others reside in the area just outside of a town because it 
 
 1. Jonah Kaplan, Deals or Disagreements? What To Expect in NC General Assembly’s New 
Session with a Divided Government, ABC11 (Jan. 9, 2019), https://abc11.com/politics/deals-or-
disagreements-whats-on-the-table-for-nc-general-assemblys-new-session/5041877/ 
[https://perma.cc/SP7S-2R6Z]; Wiley J. Williams, “Manteo to Murphy,” NCPEDIA (2006), 
https://www.ncpedia.org/manteo-murphy [https://perma.cc/5DFJ-TXYW]. 
 2. How NC Cities Work, NC LEAGUE MUNICIPALITIES, 
https://www.nclm.org/advocacy/how-nc-cities-work [https://perma.cc/7DX-T8BJ]. 
 3. North Carolina Municipalities Ranked by the June 1, 2016 Estimated Population, OFF. 
ST. BUDGET & MGMT., https://files.nc.gov/ncosbm/demog/rankedbysizesmallest_2016.html 
[https://perma.cc/848P-J67B]. 
 4. This Comment will use the terms town, city, and municipality interchangeably 
throughout. 
 5. Estimates of Municipal and Non-Municipal Populations of North Carolina and North 
Carolina Counties for July 1, 2016: Standard Population Estimates, N.C. OFF. ST. BUDGET & 
MGMT., https://files.nc.gov/ncosbm/demog/muninonmunipop_2016.html [https://perma.cc/P7MJ-
2CHT]. 
 6. Id. (identifying the non-municipal population of the state as forty-four percent of the 
entire state’s population). 
 7. See Nathan Arnosti & Amy Liu, Why Rural America Needs Cities, BROOKINGS (Nov. 
30, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-rural-america-needs-cities/ [https://perma.cc/
F7C7-Q2EL]. 
 8. See id.  
 9. Joe Cortright, Are Americans Fleeing Cities for Suburbs? Not So Fast, CITYLAB (June 
11, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/life/2018/06/are-americans-fleeing-cities-for-suburbs-not-so-
fast/562580/ [https://perma.cc/MH7C-FJ8B] (explaining that the growth of suburbs often 
outpaces growth of their related urban areas).  
 10. See The Differences Between City, Suburban, and Rural Living, PROP. MGMTT, INC. 
(Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.rentpmi.com/blog/2018/02/02/the-differences-between-city-
suburban-and-rural-living/ [https://perma.cc/X8HN-GSQ4]. 
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is the only place they can afford.11 For some, the areas just outside of 
municipalities are where their communities have lived for over a century.12 
While non-municipal residents may live near the city, they are not 
technically considered part of the city.13 They do not live there, so they do 
not vote there.14 
Unincorporated residents look to the county as their primary 
representative.15 The county often takes on the responsibility of rendering 
services akin to those provided by a municipality, such as sewer and water 
services, building inspections, and planning for the county’s 
unincorporated areas.16 Such services supplement those the county provides 
to all its residents—including those who live inside of municipalities—such 
as the administration of welfare programs and the county school district.17 
Despite neither living inside the town nor voting there, many semi-
urban residents of North Carolina might be surprised to learn that if they 
want to do anything with their property, they must apply for zoning permits 
with the neighboring town rather than with the county zoning office, the 
government office that ordinarily meets every other need for 
unincorporated county residents.18 
The people who live outside a town’s boundaries but have their land-
use planning and zoning determined by that town are residents of the 
town’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (“ETJ”).19 Residents living in the ETJ do 
not vote for the town’s elected leaders and do not have political means 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. Daniel T. Lichter et al., Municipal Underbounding: Annexation and Racial Exclusion in 
Small Southern Towns, 72 RURAL SOC. 47, 49 (2007) (discussing the concentration of black 
Americans in the Rural South outside the borders of established municipalities). 
 13. Id. at 50.  
 14. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-66 (2017) (“[E]ach city shall be governed by a mayor and a 
council of three members, who shall be elected from the city at large. . . .”). 
 15. Basics of North Carolina County Government, N.C. CTR. FOR COUNTY RES., 
http://www.ncacc.org/DocumentCenter/View/1094/White-Paper-Basics-of-North-Carolina-County-
Government?bidId= [https://perma.cc/A67A-BRC9]. 
 16. Id. Every North Carolina resident resides in one of the state’s one hundred counties. Id. 
The county residents who do not live in city limits have only one local government office to look 
to: the county government. Id. Those residents living in municipalities have two different local 
government representatives: their town government and their county government. DAVID W. 
OWENS, THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCE WITH MUNICIPAL EXTRATERRITORIAL PLANNING 
JURISDICTION 3 (2006) [hereinafter OWENS, EXPERIENCE], https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/
www.sog.unc.edu/files/additional_files/ss20.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K95-NMB4]. In North 
Carolina, counties and municipalities only have governing authority that has been delegated to 
them by the North Carolina General Assembly. How NC Cities Work, supra note 2. 
 17. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 1. 
 18. DAVID W. OWENS, LAND USE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA 30 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter 
OWENS, LAND USE LAW].  
 19. Id.  
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other than speaking at public hearings; thus, they have little recourse to 
influence the zoning decisions made about their property.20 
A town can make zoning and construction decisions about an ETJ 
without accountability to the ETJ residents. For example, the town council 
in Mebane, North Carolina, approved plans to route a new highway through 
West End, a community in Mebane’s ETJ, to avoid affecting town 
residents’ property values (and therefore the town’s tax base). 21 The ETJ 
residents in West End did not have any political power to hold the town 
officials accountable for this decision.22 
The justifications offered for allowing towns to exercise their zoning 
power outside of their borders seem reasonable at first glance. For one, 
municipalities were presumed to have a justifiable interest in the areas just 
outside of their boundaries.23 Because the areas just outside town borders 
are what people see first when entering the town, logically, towns have an 
interest in maintaining the appearance and development of these areas.24 
Essentially, the ETJ was justified to prevent the development of shanty 
towns on the outskirts of municipalities because the town did not want 
visitors to see undesirable land uses.25 
Second, exercising zoning power outside town boundaries gives 
municipalities the ability to control development outside of the town’s 
borders as the town population grows.26 When the statute granting ETJ 
authority to all municipalities became law, North Carolina’s population 
was growing steadily, and that growth was relatively evenly distributed 
across the state.27 If North Carolina’s towns were growing, then it was 
reasonable to assume that towns were going to outgrow current boundaries 
and need to expand.28 But haphazard expansion would not have been 
healthy growth for the state, so the General Assembly presumed that this 
 
 20. Id.  
 21. Danielle Purifoy, A Place Called Mebane, SCALAWAG (Aug. 8, 2016), 
https://www.scalawagmagazine.org/2016/08/a-place-called-mebane/ [https://perma.cc/BM5D-
UK7F]. 
 22. See id. (“The city’s boundaries stretch around their homes and even bisect their streets, 
but never in the over 100 years since emancipated Blacks settled on these lands has the City of 
Mebane incorporated them into its polity. They can neither vote in municipal elections nor run for 
public office. And yet, Mebane controls their land for up to three miles outside the city limits.”).  
 23. JOSEPH M. HUNT, JR., ET AL., NORTH CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY REPORT OF THE 
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION 18 (1958) [hereinafter HUNT, MUNICIPAL 
REPORT]. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. North Carolina Population 2019, WORLD POPULATION REV. (Apr. 1, 2019), 
http://worldpopulationreview.com/states/north-carolina-population/ [https://perma.cc/C7PL-
8JAT]. 
 28. HUNT, MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 23. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1794 (2019) 
1798 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97 
growth could be planned by giving municipalities the authority to zone 
outside of the town boundaries.29 
This Comment will concentrate on the second concern raised by the 
state’s municipalities—that of organized growth. Residents’ interest in 
external perceptions of their town is complex enough to deserve its own 
analysis, especially considering differing cultural perceptions for land 
development. The scope of this Comment is limited, therefore, to the ETJ 
as it relates to the growth of municipalities. 
For many North Carolina municipalities, the growth that occurred in 
the mid-twentieth century has reversed into population decline. While 
growth in the state overall has continued, it is concentrated in an 
increasingly small number of areas (e.g., the greater Charlotte area, the 
Triangle,30 and the Triad31).32 Though municipal growth may not be as 
concentrated as it once was,33 thirty-four counties in the state experienced a 
decrease in the rate of growth between 2016 and 2017.34 
While many municipalities have seen population growth level off, 
they have also lost the ability to grow their boundaries on their own terms. 
The General Assembly passed the ETJ statute in 196035 with growth in 
mind, and a majority of current municipal officials say that they intend to 
annex the area that the town is regulating via ETJ.36 However, forcing 
annexation of these areas has become fiscally problematic because of a 
major change in the state’s annexation statute that occurred in 2011.37 
Towns are now practically limited to growing boundaries because it must 
assume some of the cost of annexation.38 This could result in a number of 
 
 29. Id. 
 30. North Carolina’s Research Triangle is composed of Chapel Hill, Durham, and Raleigh. 
Research Triangle Park, NCPEDIA (2006), https://www.ncpedia.org/research-triangle-park 
[https://perma.cc/R98L-T4KR]. 
 31. North Carolina’s Piedmont Triad is made up of Winston-Salem, Greensboro, and High 
Point. About the Region, PIEDMONT TRIAD REGIONAL COUNCIL, 
https://www.ptrc.org/about/about-the-region [https://perma.cc/V4TD-BMW3]. 
 32. See Rebecca Tippett, Are NC County Growth Patterns Shifting?, CAROLINA 
DEMOGRAPHY, https://demography.cpc.unc.edu/2018/03/22/are-nc-county-growth-patterns-
shifting/ [https://perma.cc/R3FW-WBH7] (stating that thirty-four of North Carolina counties 
experienced negative growth between 2016 and 2017). 
 33. Id. (“During the first half of the decade, more than half (53%) of the state’s growth 
occurred in one of three counties: Wake, Mecklenburg, and Durham.”) 
 34. Id. 
 35. Act of June 29, 1958, ch. 1204, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 1354, 1354–55 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-181.2 (2017)). 
 36. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 10. 
 37. Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. 
Sess. Laws 1649 (codified as amended in scattered sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A).  
 38. See N.C. GEN. STAT § 160A-58.56(b) (2017). 
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ETJ communities being left in planning and development limbo with no 
end in sight. 
Some argue that communities left in ETJs function as dumping 
grounds for municipalities’ undesirable land uses while not being able to 
participate in the town governance that regulates land use and development 
planning.39 
This Comment will proceed in three parts to address: (1) why are 
many ETJ communities unlikely ever to be annexed by the town that 
regulates them; (2) are these communities actually being harmed by the use 
of ETJs; and (3) how can communities that no longer wish to be regulated 
by a neighboring town remedy their situation? 
Part I will provide a summary of the ETJ and annexation legislation to 
demonstrate that, when these statutes were passed in 1959 and 1960, they 
were intended to focus on municipal growth. It will then show that the 
annexation reforms passed in 2011 and 2012 by the newly elected and 
Republican-controlled state government40 disrupted the intent of these 
statutes by making annexation more difficult. When considered with the 
fact that small-town growth is not proceeding as it has in the past, this 
means that many North Carolina residents are stuck in a neighboring 
town’s ETJ and will most likely never be annexed into the city limits. 
Part II will examine the theorized negative consequences of living in 
an ETJ. Publicly available data and research by advocacy organizations 
suggests that many theorized negative consequences might be 
overexaggerated. The data also reveals that some ETJ communities are not 
receiving water and sewer services while communities within the municipal 
boundaries and communities outside of the ETJ are. But even in 
communities where a concentration of undesirable land uses does not exist, 
residents may still feel disenfranchised when they learn that decisions are 
made for them by people they did not directly elect because county 
residents have the right to vote for only county commissioners and on 
matters of county concern. 
Part III will describe what options ETJ residents in North Carolina 
have if they no longer want to be in the ETJ. This part will first look at 
what options already exist and will primarily focus on the available 
annexation pathways for ETJ residents. The annexation reforms of 2011 
created new pathways for distressed areas to force annexation, but 
annexation is not the answer for all. There are no statutory paths for ETJ 
 
 39. Purifoy, supra note 21, at 18.  
 40. GOP Takes Control of State Legislature, WRAL (Nov. 3, 2010), 
https://www.wral.com/news/local/politics/story/8556651/ [https://perma.cc/VTN4-6GEB] (stating 
that the North Carolina Republican “party had seized control of the state General Assembly for 
the first time in more than a century”). 
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residents that might wish to be released from the ETJ without being 
annexed into the town. Finally, this part will then propose some possible 
changes to the ETJ statute that would give landowners more of a voice in 
the zoning and land-use planning decisions that are made about their 
property. 
I.  WHY ARE MANY ETJ COMMUNITIES UNLIKELY EVER TO BE ANNEXED 
INTO THE TOWNS THAT ARE REGULATING THEM? 
The areas surrounding a town are regulated by two statutes: the ETJ 
statute41 and the annexation statute.42 The state started with granting towns 
zoning powers and then granting general ETJ zoning and annexation 
powers.43 
A. History of Zoning and Early Efforts to Zone Outside of Town 
Boundaries 
Zoning laws resulted from a perceived need for a town to control the 
development that was taking place within its borders.44 These laws 
typically divide a municipality into districts and regulate the types of 
buildings and uses that are allowed to occur in that district.45 Zoning laws 
were held to be constitutional in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,46 which 
allowed municipalities to enact laws that determine how a landowner can 
and cannot use his land.47 Through the mid-nineteenth century, zoning 
became more and more common until it became the norm for 
municipalities to have zoning ordinances in place.48 
In North Carolina, the legislature initially granted zoning authority to 
a municipality on a case-by-case basis.49 The General Assembly finally 
 
 41. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State, 
ch. 111, § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws —, — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-2-2(e)), 
https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2019-2020/SL2019-111.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V8YJ-9ZGR]; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(b) (2017), repealed by Act 
to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 
N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 42. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-21 (2017). 
 43. See id. 
 44. See Amanda Erickson, The Birth of Zoning Codes, a History, CITYLAB (June 19, 2012), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2012/06/birth-zoning-codes-history/2275/ [https://perma.cc/V7SD-
DWEW]. 
 45. See OWENS, LAND USE LAW, supra note 18, at 13. 
 46. 272 U.S. 365, 390–95 (1926) (holding that a zoning ordinance must be clearly 
unreasonable before it can be declared unconstitutional). 
 47. Id. 
 48. OWENS, LAND USE LAW, supra note 18, at 15.  
 49. Id. at 16. 
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granted general zoning powers to North Carolina municipalities in 1923.50 
As municipal governments enacted zoning laws within town boundaries, a 
few towns tried to exercise control over the areas outside of municipal 
limits.51 
For instance, the town of Washington, North Carolina, tried to 
regulate the dumping of fish into its water source that was occurring 
outside of the town limits.52 In State v. Eason,53 the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina held that a city is permitted to regulate only what the state 
legislature has authorized it to regulate, and Washington had not been 
granted authority to regulate the dumping of fish on the other side of the 
river.54 
The court explicitly noted in this case that if the legislature granted 
this power to Washington, then there would be nothing inherently 
unconstitutional about the town exercising the power despite the fact that it 
would be acting outside of its territorial limits.55 
Later, the legislature began to grant certain municipalities the power 
to regulate beyond their borders.56 The legislature granted Greensboro the 
power to regulate sanitation for up to a mile outside of its boundaries.57 
This grant of power survived a court challenge in State v. Rice, confirming 
the power of the state legislature that the court established in State v. 
Eason.58 
 
 50. Act to Empower Cities and Towns to Adopt Zoning Regulations, ch. 250, 1923 N.C. 
Sess. Laws 572, 572–76. 
 51. See, e.g., State v. Eason, 114 N.C. 787, 787–97, 19 S.E. 88, 88–91 (1894). 
 52. Id. at 795–96, 19 S.E. at 90–91. 
 53. Id. at 787, 19 S.E. at 88. 
 54. Id. at 795–96, 19 S.E. at 90–91. 
 55. Id. at 792, 19 S.E. at 89. (“[T]he legislature unquestionably had the power to extend the 
jurisdiction of the town, for police purposes, to the middle of the river or to the opposite bank; 
and had the line been described as crossing the other side when it reached the river, and running 
thence along that shore to a point opposite the beginning, thence to the beginning, the effect 
would have been to extend the boundary for the exercise of the power to prohibit nuisance, 
delegated to the town, across the adjacent bed of the river, while the territorial limit of its 
authority for all purposes other than the exercise of police powers would have been the low-water 
mark on the north bank.”). 
 56. See State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 635, 74 S.E. 582. 582 (1912) (discussing the charter of 
Greensboro, in which the General Assembly provided that all ordinances of the city enacted “in 
the exercise of police powers given to it for sanitary purposes or for the protection of the property 
of the city, shall apply to the territory outside of the city limits within one mile of same in all 
directions”); OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 6 (stating that the General Assembly granted 
Raleigh, Chapel Hill, Gastonia, and Tarboro the power to adopt zoning ordinances in the one-mile 
area surrounding their municipal limits). 
 57. See 158 N.C. at 635, 74 S.E. 582, 582.  
 58. Id. at 638, 74 S.E. 582, 583 (“The question is not how the city authorities are chosen, but 
what power the Legislature has conferred upon them over adjacent districts beyond the city limits 
in which may be set up establishments, businesses, or other things which would be injurious to 
the health of its people.”). 
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The legislature then began to grant the general zoning power to a 
handful of municipalities to help address growing populations.59 In 1949, 
the towns of Raleigh, Chapel Hill, Gastonia, and Tarboro were all granted 
the power to adopt zoning ordinances in the one-mile area surrounding 
municipal limits.60 
A decade later, the General Assembly created the Municipal 
Government Study Commission (“Commission”) to examine the 
difficulties that municipalities were experiencing related to growth and 
expansion.61 The resulting report recognized that all towns have a 
significant interest in the land that borders municipality limits and made 
recommendations for the establishment of an extraterritorial zoning statute 
that granted, writ large, the authority to all municipalities of a certain size 
to enact zoning ordinances for the areas outside municipal boundaries.62 
The resulting statute is discussed in detail below, but it by and large 
incorporated the recommendations of the study report and granted ETJ 
authority to municipalities.63 
The report emphasized that towns have a “special interest in the areas 
immediately adjacent to their limits. These areas, in the normal course of 
events, will at some point be annexed to the city bringing with them any 
problems growing out of their chaotic and disorganized development.”64 
The statute emphasized that the decision as to what areas to zone outside 
the town limits must be based on “existing or projected urban development 
and areas of critical concern to the city as evidenced by officially adopted 
plans for its development.”65 The report and the statute, while 
acknowledging that there were exceptions to this rule, emphasized that, 
overall, the tool of ETJ zoning should be used as a means for planning the 
growth of urban areas.66 
 
 59. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 6. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See HUNT, MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 23, at Introductory Letter; JOSEPH M. HUNT, 
JR. ET AL., REPORT OF THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION, NORTH CAROLINA 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT at Introductory Letter (1959) [hereinafter HUNT, 
SUPPLEMENT]. 
 62. HUNT, MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 18; see Act of June 29, 1958, ch. 1204, 
§ 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 1354, 1354–55 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-181.2 
(2017)).  
 63. See infra Section I.B. 
 64. HUNT, MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 18. 
 65. See Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the 
State, ch. 111, § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws —, — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-2-
2(e)), https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2019-2020/SL2019-111.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V8YJ-9ZGR]; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(b) (2017), repealed by Act 
to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 
N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 66. See id.; HUNT, MUNICIPAL REPORT, supra note 23, at 18. 
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Recognizing the problematic nature of simply planning for future 
growth without a plan for what to do with urbanized areas once they have 
developed, the Commission requested a study on how municipalities 
should proceed with annexing areas that have developed or will develop.67 
Subsequently, the Commission published a supplement to its ETJ report 
focused almost exclusively on annexation.68 Specifically, a memo 
summarizing the reports and resulting legislation written by George Esser 
(who served as staff to the Commission) emphasized that annexation could 
not be the only solution to a growing urban area’s problems.69 Instead, the 
memo said that annexation must be considered with planning proposals, 
such as the ETJ power, to work towards sound urban growth.70 The ETJ 
and annexation statutes passed in the late 1950s were intended to work 
together toward sound urban development.71 
B. The ETJ Statute 
The ETJ statute, passed by the General Assembly in 1960, has not 
changed much since its initial passage. Section 160A-360 provides that all 
municipalities have the power to zone within “a defined area extending not 
more than one mile beyond its limits.”72 In addition to this initial grant of 
power, the statute allows towns of larger populations to extend this area up 
to three miles with the approval of the county that has jurisdiction over the 
area.73 If a county is already zoning the area then the town cannot extend its 
zoning authority into it.74 Furthermore, a property owner who has acquired 
 
 67. See HUNT, SUPPLEMENT, supra note 61, at 5.  
 68. See generally id. (discussing issues relating to annexation and the impact of legislative 
changes on annexation).  
 69. See GEORGE H. ESSER, JR., STAFF MEMORANDUM PREPARED FOR THE MUNICIPAL 
STUDY COMMISSION 64–65 (1958), https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/
reports/mgsc-1958%20esser%20memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/QLH6-KYX9]. 
 70. See id. at 75. 
 71. George H. Esser, Jr., Legislation of Interest to Municipal Officials, POPULAR GOV’T, 
June 1959, at 14 (describing “package of bills” including both ETJ and annexation legislation as 
“designed to meet the challenges of urban growth”). 
 72. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State, 
ch. 111, § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws —, — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160D-2-1(a), -
2-2(a) to (b)), https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2019-2020/SL2019-
111.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8YJ-9ZGR]; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(a) (2017), 
repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the 
State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 73. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State 
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160D-2-1(a), -2-2(a) to 
(b)); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(a) (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, 
and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 74. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State 
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-2-2(c)); see also 
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vested rights under a permit prior to the initiation of ETJ retains the ability 
to exercise those rights.75 
The statute also requires that, if and when a municipality chooses to 
adopt a zoning ordinance for its ETJ, it must give the residents of the ETJ 
proportional representation on the planning board.76 This is done by 
appointing “at least one resident of the entire extraterritorial zoning and 
subdivision regulation area to the planning board of adjustment that makes 
recommendations or grants relief in these matters.”77 According to a 
University of North Carolina School of Government survey conducted in 
2004–2005, sixty-two percent of responding municipalities utilized the ETJ 
power in some way.78 
Challenges to the ETJ power by ETJ residents have mostly failed due 
to lack of standing.79 So far, any successful challenges to the exercise of 
ETJ power have succeeded only because of the town’s failure to follow 
proper procedure to establish an ETJ.80 Courts have continually upheld the 
right of the state to grant the ETJ power to a municipality and the rights of 
municipalities to exercise it as long as it complies with the statute.81 
C. The Original Annexation Statute 
After decades of expanding municipal boundaries on a case-by-case 
basis, North Carolina’s 1947 annexation statute allowed annexation to be 
 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(e) (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize 
the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 75. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State 
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-2-2(k)); see also 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360(i) (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize 
the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 76. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State 
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-3-7); see also N.C. 
GEN. STAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the 
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 77. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State 
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-3-7); see also N.C. 
GEN. STAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the 
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 78. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 9. 
 79. See, e.g., Templeton v. Town of Boone, 208 N.C. App. 50, 54–56, 701 S.E.2d 709, 713–
14 (2010).  
 80. See, e.g., Town of Swansboro v. Odum, 96 N.C. App. 115, 117, 384 S.E.2d 302, 302 
(1989); Town of Lake Waccamaw v. Savage, 86 N.C. App. 211, 215, 356 S.E.2d 810, 812 
(1987). 
 81. See, e.g., Taylor v. City of Raleigh, 290 N.C. 608, 619, 227 S.E.2d 574, 582 (1976); 
Macon County v. Town of Highlands, 187 N.C. App. 752, 758, 4 S.E.2d 17, 21 (2007); Town of 
Green Level v. Alamance County, 184 N.C. App. 665, 675, 646 S.E.2d 851, 857 (2007); Bryan v. 
Raynor, 94 N.C. App. 91, 98, 379 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1989). 
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initiated by the city with no input from the to-be-annexed landowners.82 
Some considered this legislation a failure, however, because it required a 
level of legislative intervention.83 The general assembly passed a new, more 
comprehensive annexation statute in 1959.84 
Though small changes were made to this statute between 1959 and 
2010, it was still recognizable until the Annexation Reform Act of 2011.85 
To explain how the Annexation Reform Act altered the previous 
annexation legislation, the following paragraphs will analyze the 
annexation statute as it was codified in the 2009 North Carolina General 
Statutes.86 
The 2009 annexation statute noted that sound urban development is 
essential to economic development and that municipal boundaries should 
extend to include areas intensively used for residential, commercial, 
industrial, institutional, or governmental purposes to provide high-quality 
services needed therein for public health, safety, and welfare.87 Along with 
these greater policy goals, the statute regulated towns of five thousand 
people or fewer differently than towns of greater than five thousand.88 
Under this annexation statute, a municipality could not annex land 
unless the land had been developed for “urban purposes.”89 “Urban 
purposes” was defined by what percentage of the land to be annexed, at the 
time, was used for residential, commercial, industrial, institutional, or 
governmental purposes.90 In addition, cities of more than five thousand 
 
 82. See INST. OF GOV’T, UNIV. OF N.C. CHAPEL HILL, 1947 LEGISLATIVE SUMMARY: 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA 25–26 (1947). 
 83. Frayda S. Bluestein, The Development of North Carolina’s Annexation Legislation: The 
1947 Legislation, UNC SCH. GOV’T, https://www.sog.unc.edu/resource-series/development-north-
carolina’s-annexation-legislation-1947-legislation [https://perma.cc/Z8RM-FFRU]. The legislature 
was still spending a substantial amount of time on special annexation legislation for individual 
cities to expand their boundaries. Id. 
 84. Act of June 29, 1958, ch. 1204, § 1, 1959 N.C. Sess. Laws 1354, 1354–55 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-181.2 (2017)). 
 85. See generally Act to Reform Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, 
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (revising North Carolina’s annexation statute).  
 86. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31 (2009), amended by Act to Reform the Involuntary 
Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1694, 1667–70. 
 87. Id. § 160A-33, repealed by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North 
Carolina, ch. 396, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649. 
 88. Id. (stating that towns with populations greater than five thousand people were given 
greater annexation powers than towns of less than five thousand because it was presumed that 
towns with larger populations were growing at faster rates), repealed by Act to Reform the 
Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649. 
 89. Id. § 160A-36(c), repealed by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North 
Carolina, ch. 396, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649. 
 90. See id.  
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people could annex an undeveloped area (i.e., non-urban area) if it lies 
between the municipal limits and an area developed for urban purposes.91 
This statute also allowed for two different methods of annexation: 
voluntary or involuntary.92 Voluntary annexation by petition allowed 
property owners, regardless of whether the land had been developed for 
urban purposes, to present a petition to the appropriate board signed by 
every single property owner in the relevant area, asking for the 
municipality to annex their land.93 The town was permitted to annex this 
area but not required to do so.94 
Under this annexation statue, towns could also initiate and complete 
involuntary annexation, even over land where property owners did not want 
to be annexed by the town.95 
D. How the ETJ Statute and Annexation Statutes Initially Worked 
Together 
The same legislature passed both North Carolina’s ETJ statute and 
annexation statute in response to the report by the Commission and 
intended the statutes to work together. In at least a majority of instances, 
planning officials intended for ETJs to be related to future annexations.96 
The logic of the two statutes jibes easily. A municipality should have 
the ability to plan ahead for annexation by exercising some control over the 
areas it plans to annex. A study conducted by the UNC School of 
Government supports this contention, reporting that two-thirds of 
responding municipalities intended the area they were regulating by ETJ to 
be annexed in the future.97 
The powers that a municipality had prior to the annexation reform 
allowed it to act on this plan.98 Changes to the annexation statute made by 
the 2011–2012 state legislature foiled any possible cooperation between the 
 
 91. Id. § 160A-48(d), repealed by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North 
Carolina, ch. 396, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649. 
 92. See id. § 160A-31(a), amended by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of 
North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1667–70; see also Daren Bakst, 
Forced Annexation, JOHN LOCKE FOUND., https://johnlocke.org/site-docs/research/
2011issueguide/18forcedannexation.html [https://perma.cc/Z8Q4-6834]. 
 93. Bakst, supra note 92. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 10. 
 97. Id. 
 98. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-34, -46 (2011) (granting involuntary annexation authority), 
repealed by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, §§ 1, 7, 
2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649; Nolan v. Village of Marvin, 360 N.C. 256, 262, 624 S.E.2d 
305, 309 (2006) (upholding power of municipalities to engage in involuntary annexation so long 
as the municipality complies with the procedures of the statute). 
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statutes. Even if the use of ETJs and future annexation were not tied, the 
annexation reforms passed in 2011 effectively erased the ability of towns to 
use these tools as the earlier legislature intended.99 
E. Annexation Reform 
The 2010 general election led to a drastic shift in the composition of 
the North Carolina General Assembly.100 The legislature became 
significantly more conservative and an emphasis on property rights led to 
an overhaul of the state’s annexation statute.101 There were four significant 
changes to the law. 
First, the new annexation statute completely eliminated the distinction 
between municipalities with populations greater or fewer than five 
thousand people.102 This removed a fundamental path to growth that was 
available to larger towns before the reform: the ability to include 
undeveloped land in an annexation proposal if the land was between the 
town boundaries and a developed area that the town sought to annex. 103 
Second, the new annexation statute added a referendum requirement 
that allows property owners, subject to involuntary annexation, to vote 
down the annexation.104 Municipalities wishing to annex contiguous land 
would be required to hold a referendum. If less than half of the affected 
population voted in favor of the annexation, it would not move forward.105 
Municipalities were also required to pay for this referendum.106 
 
 99. See Laura Leslie, Annexation Changes ‘Punitive’?, WRAL (May 17, 2012), 
https://www.wral.com/news/state/nccapitol/blogpost/11110324/ [https://perma.cc/BPN9-4VJJ] 
(reporting that during the passage of the Annexation Reform Act, there were nine forced 
annexations under way). 
 100. GOP Takes Control of State Legislature, WRAL (Nov. 3, 2010), 
https://www.wral.com/news/local/politics/story/8556651/ [https://perma.cc/AW4X-9WGS] 
(“[T]he [Republican] party . . . seized control of the state General Assembly for the first time in 
more than a century.”). 
 101. See Sarah Burrows, Forced Annexation Could Become History in North Carolina, 
CAROLINA J. (May 2, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.carolinajournal.com/news-article/forced-
annexation-could-become-history-in-north-carolina [https://perma.cc/S9JM-26W5]. 
 102. Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649 (codified as amended at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. §§ 160A-58.50 to -58.63 (2017)). 
 103. Id.  
 104. Act of May 30, 2012, ch. 11, § 1, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 19, 19–20 (codified at N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.64 (2017)). 
 105. The original Annexation Reform legislation did not require a referendum but rather gave 
property owners the ability to deny the annexation by petition. Frayda S. Bluestein, Annexation 
Reform: Referendum Replaces Petition to Deny, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (June 
28, 2012), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/annexation-reform-referendum-replaces-petition-to-
deny/ [https://perma.cc/QFK6-T52P]. The ability to petition was struck down by a Wake 
County Superior Court Judge as unconstitutional. Id. The legislature responded by changing the 
petition to a referendum requirement in 2012. Id. 
 106. Id. 
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Third, the new statute required that if a municipality planned to 
provide water and sewer service to an annexed area—which it is required 
to do if it is providing water and sewer service within the existing town 
limits—it must build the connecting lines free of charge to each residence 
that wishes to participate.107 Previously, when towns provided newly 
annexed properties with access to these services, the individual land owners 
were responsible for connecting to the city-owned lines and paying for that 
connection.108 Now, municipalities not only have to pay for the main line 
but must also provide the individual hookups to the line free of charge.109 
This significantly increased the potential cost of any involuntary 
annexation.110 Furthermore, the statute required that the connecting lines be 
completed within three-and-a-half years of the annexation.111 
Fourth, and most interestingly, the statute gave economically 
distressed areas—those where fifty-one percent of the households have an 
income less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level—the ability to 
require a neighboring town to annex the area by presenting the town with a 
petition signed by seventy-five percent of the property owners in the 
area.112 In this situation, the town does not have a choice and must annex 
the area requesting it.113 In addition, residents, rather than the property 
owners, who live in an economically distressed area can request annexation 
with a petition signed by two-thirds of the residents, but the town is not 
required to acquiesce to their request in this case.114 Both of these 
annexation methods require fewer signatures than voluntary annexation 
under the previous law, which required 100 percent agreement.115 
In a blog post published soon after the annexation reforms became 
law, Frayda Bluestein, a professor at the UNC School of Government, 
detailed the increased costs that a city looking to expand its borders via 
involuntary annexation would incur, and she posited that involuntary 
annexations would become less common due to cost concerns.116 
 
 107. Frayda S. Bluestein, Annexation Reform: A Summary of the New Law, COATES’ 
CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (Aug. 2013), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/annexation-reform-and-
interesting-new-proposal-in-the-legislature/ [https://perma.cc/V93Z-FZG2]. 
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id.; see also Frayda S. Bluestein, Water and Sewer Extensions “At No Cost”—
Analyzing the New Annexation Law, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (Aug. 2, 2011), 
https://canons.sog.unc.edu/water-and-sewer-extensions-”at-no-cost”-analyzing-the-new-
annexation-law/ [https://perma.cc/2EYA-JFK3]. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1794 (2019) 
2019] EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 1809 
According to an interview with the North Carolina League of 
Municipalities,117 the League is unaware of a single involuntary annexation 
that has taken place since the passage of the 2011–2012 annexation reform 
laws.118 
Now that the ETJ and annexation statutes are not able to work 
together as originally intended, many ETJ residents who may have 
eventually been annexed and provided with city services in exchange for 
higher property taxes are now stuck in planning limbo. With the increased 
cost of involuntary annexation and the logistical difficulties of voluntary 
annexation, some residents may find themselves living permanently in an 
ETJ. Part II will examine whether there are detriments to living in an ETJ 
without hope of annexation. 
II.  ARE COMMUNITIES ACTUALLY BEING HARMED BY THE USE OF ETJS? 
Many have written about the dangers of living on the urban fringe, 
claiming that undesirable land uses are overly concentrated in these areas 
and that the harms affect minority and lower-income communities more 
than any other.119 
Considering an ETJ as a statutorily defined urban-fringe area, this part 
will proceed by examining a series of perceived shortcomings to living in 
an ETJ and by using publicly available data and research from the Cedar 
Grove Institute and UNC Center for Civil Rights to determine whether 
those shortcomings actually exist. Specifically, it will examine four 
different shortcomings that are often perceived or assumed about ETJs: (1) 
lack of representation in town decisions about ETJ communities, (2) racial 
motivation and use of ETJs to isolate minority communities, (3) 
disproportionate concentration of undesirable land uses in ETJs, and (4) 
lack of government services in urbanized ETJ communities. 
A. Lack of Representation in Town Decisions about ETJ Communities 
The first perceived shortcoming with the use of ETJ planning is a lack 
of representation of the affected property owners on the board making 
 
 117. Who We Are, N.C. LEAGUE MUNICIPALITIES, https://www.nclm.org/who-we-are 
[https://perma.cc/3GBS-49DM] (“The North Carolina League of Municipalities is a service and 
advocacy organization representing nearly every city and town in North Carolina, helping them to 
more effectively and efficiently serve their residents.”). 
 118. Email from Kim Hibbard, Gen. Counsel Emerita, N.C. League of Municipalities, to 
Matthew L. Farley, (Jan. 24, 2019, 04:29 EST) (on file with North Carolina Law Review). In 
comparison, there were nine annexations taking place when the legislation was passed. Leslie, 
supra note 99.  
 119. See generally Lichter, supra note 12 (discussing the effects of non-municipal residency 
on black populations in the South); Purifoy, supra note 21 (discussing the impact of ETJ and 
annexation on black communities in North Carolina). 
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decisions regarding development plans.120 By definition, property owners in 
the ETJ own property that falls outside of the town limits and therefore 
those owners, unless they are also currently residing and registered to vote 
inside the town limits, are ineligible to vote in town elections.121 The 
relevant election would be the town council or town board that is 
responsible for appointing the planning board. The planning board controls 
the planning in the ETJ, subject to the final say of the town council or town 
board on many types of decisions made by the planning board.122 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that this additional 
representation is not constitutionally necessary because the ETJ residents 
actually receive all the representation required by the State Constitution via 
the North Carolina General Assembly, the body that granted the power to 
the towns to exercise the extraterritorial zoning authority.123 However, the 
ETJ statute requires the planning board to have proportional representation 
for affected residents living outside of the town boundaries. If a town has 
exercised the ETJ power, there must be at least one ETJ representative on 
the planning board even if the ETJ population is not large enough to 
proportionally justify a full member on the board.124 This provision has 
even caused some to cite North Carolina’s ETJ statute as an exemplar for 
providing representation to residents who live in the ETJ.125 Members 
representing the ETJ are appointed by the county commissioners who 
represent the ETJ residents.126  
 
 120. See, e.g., Purifoy, supra note 21 (highlighting an example of a municipality with 
underrepresented property owners). 
 121. Municipal Elections, N.C. ST. BOARD ELECTIONS, https://www.ncsbe.gov/elections 
[https://perma.cc/R6NF-JUMH] (“Although municipal elections are conducted by county boards 
of election, only residents of the municipality are qualified to vote in the election. These voters 
must have resided in the municipality for at least 30 days prior to the date of the election.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 122. See OWENS, LAND USE LAW, supra note 18, at 8–9. 
 123. State v. Rice, 158 N.C. 635, 636, 74 S.E. 582, 582 (1912). According to a UNC School 
of Government Survey, twenty-four percent of responding cities did not have adequate ETJ 
representation. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 12. 
 124. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State, 
ch. 111, § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws —, — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-3-7), 
https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2019-2020/SL2019-111.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V8YJ-9ZGR]; see also N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed by Act to 
Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 
N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 125. Andrew P. Gulotta, Comment, Darkness on the Edge of Town: Reforming Municipal 
Extraterritorial Planning & Zoning in Illinois to Ensure Regional Effectiveness & 
Representation, 28 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 495, 518 (2009). 
 126. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State 
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-3-7); see also N.C. 
GEN. STAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the 
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
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However, there are still a number of shortcomings with this setup. 
First, the planning board is not always a board of final decision.127 Many 
board decisions can be reversed or amended by the town council from 
which the ETJ residents do not have any recourse.128 Therefore, in instances 
where the planning board is merely making a recommendation to the town 
council, the ETJ representative on the planning board or board of 
adjustment does not have meaningfully more influence over the final 
decision than an ETJ resident who is not a member of the planning 
board.129 
Second, there is no guarantee that the ETJ representative will be 
incentivized to advocate effectively for the entire ETJ as opposed to just 
the area where the representative lives. There are very few requirements for 
who the ETJ representative must be.130 The statute requires only that the 
representative be a resident of the ETJ,131 but the ETJ will often extend 
from many different parts of the town boundary into areas that have very 
different characteristics. Under the current ETJ statute, there is nothing to 
prevent the representative being appointed from a wealthy subdivision that 
has purposefully stayed outside of the town limits to avoid property taxes 
and would continue to advocate for remaining in the ETJ, even though, 
across town, remaining in the ETJ would have a negative effect.132 
Also, many county residents may have no incentive to elect county 
commissioners who will appoint an ETJ representative that will effectively 
advocate for the ETJ. Those living in the county and outside of the ETJ 
typically have a desire to constrain city growth so that it does not interfere 
with their rural lifestyle while those in the town limits have a desire to push 
any undesirable land uses out of town limits.133 The town residents and the 
 
 127. See OWENS, LAND USE LAW, supra note 18, at 9. 
 128. Id. (stating planning boards and boards of adjustment are often only making a 
recommendation to the governing council and are often subject to review). 
 129. Adam Lovelady, Planning Board Basics, COATES’ CANONS: N.C. LOC. GOV’T L. (July 
24, 2013), https://canons.sog.unc.edu/planning-board-basics/ [https://perma.cc/V7UC-ZTQH].  
 130. See Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the 
State § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-3-7); see also 
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the 
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 131. See Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the 
State § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —; see also N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 160A-362 (2017), repealed 
by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 
2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 132. See infra text accompanying notes 154–67.  
 133. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, RURAL AND SMALL TOWN PLANNING 77 (Judith Getzels & 
Charles Thurow eds., 1979) (“[County] zoning is [an] attempt[] to counterbalance strong, natural 
market pressures for converting open space into urban development.”); see also Michael Wheeler, 
Negotiating NIMBYs: Learning from the Failure of the Massachusetts Siting Law, 11 YALE. J. ON 
REG. 241, 243 (1994). 
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non-ETJ county residents are thus mutually pushing undesirable uses 
toward each other, and it would make sense that the uses congregate in the 
ETJ. 
Furthermore, there are situations where even a directly elected 
member of the local planning authority would not make much of a 
difference because there are many small towns in rural North Carolina that 
do not have hired planning staff or even a standing planning board or board 
of adjustment.134 In many towns where the town clerk is the only town 
employee that is easily contacted,135 the county-appointed representative 
that is supposed to be the voice of ETJ residents in planning and land use 
decisions in both the ETJ and the town itself may not even exist.136 
B. Racial Motivation and Use of ETJs to Isolate Minority Communities 
In the rural South, post-slavery land settlement and migration patterns 
often resulted in black communities forming on the periphery of 
established white communities.137 Black and other minority citizens were 
forced out of developed urban areas into the county jurisdiction where 
urban services were not provided.138 However, these communities were 
integral to the functioning of the city as labor and consumer.139 
Tools like ETJ, which allow regulation of a specified area without 
providing services, are often scrutinized for racial animus or presumed to 
 
 134. See A. Fleming Bell, II, The Attorney and the Clerk, in COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL 
GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 231, 242 (Frayda S. Bluestein ed., 2d ed. 2014). 
 135. See id. 
 136. See Tod Newcombe, IT Department? In Small-Town Governments, They Rarely Exist, 
GOVERNING: THE STS. & LOCALITIES (July 2017), http://www.governing.com/columns/tech-
talk/gov-information-technology-small-governments.html [https://perma.cc/LAK3-R4CZ] 
(detailing how small municipal governments in many states are unable to afford IT departments). 
North Carolina statutes do not require towns to establish standing planning boards or boards of 
adjustment because the town council is allowed to function as either of these boards if necessary. 
See OWENS, LAND USE LAW, supra note 18, at 8. But, in these towns, it is unclear if an ETJ 
representative is actually ever involved in planning decisions. See id.at 8–10. 
 137. ALLAN M. PARNELL ET AL., THE PERSISTENCE OF POLITICAL SEGREGATION: RACIAL 
UNDERBOUNDING IN NORTH CAROLINA (2004), https://www.cedargroveinst.org/
files/regional_underbounding.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6Y8-CZWY]. 
 138. Id. at 1 (“African American neighborhoods are kept just outside of a town’s boundaries, 
resulting in lower levels of services, reduced access to infrastructure, and limited or no political 
voice in land-use and permitting decisions.”). 
 139. Sam Roberts, Commuters Nearly Double Manhattan’s Daytime Population, Census 
Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2013, 11:56 AM), https://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/
06/03/commuters-nearly-double-manhattans-daytime-population-census-says/ [https://perma.cc/
7LVA-7Q46 (dark archive)] (finding that commuters nearly double Manhattan’s daytime 
population and function as a serious economic force in the city despite not living there). 
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be racist in motivation and effect because they predominantly affect Black 
communities that developed on the outskirts of towns.140 
Mapping the prevalence of black and other minority communities 
being regulated by ETJs, rather than being annexed, is difficult to do 
because race mapping is primarily analyzed using census data that does not 
account for town or county lines when choosing where to map.141 But large-
scale mapping is not necessary to show that ETJs have been used by some 
communities to intentionally or unintentionally discriminate against 
minority communities because organizations like the Cedar Grove Institute 
and the UNC Center for Civil Rights have documented this already.142 
The neighborhoods of West End in Mebane and Jackson Hamlet and 
Midway in Moore County each provide examples of primarily Black 
neighborhoods left in planning limbo by the predominantly White towns.143 
The land around these communities has been annexed and provided with 
city services, leaving very little means to advocate for development 
because they have no meaningful voting representation in the town.144 
Black neighborhoods are also disproportionately passed over entirely 
for annexation.145 In North Carolina, where satellite annexation is allowed, 
municipalities can easily and strategically avoid black communities when 
making annexation decisions. Satellite annexation allows towns to annex 
noncontiguous pieces of land under certain circumstances, such as a town 
annexing a large industrial development.146 Satellite annexation can allow a 
town to annex valuable pieces of property without having to annex areas 
that would end up costing the city rather than benefitting it. 
The manipulation of town boundaries to exclude black communities 
from joining towns and the expansion of towns into white areas to dilute 
black votes within the municipality was not uncommon in the latter half of 
 
 140. See UNC CTR. FOR CIV. RIGHTS, INVISIBLE FENCES: MUNICIPAL UNDERBOUNDING IN 
SOUTHERN MOORE COUNTY, at ii (2006), http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/
civilrights/briefs/invisiblefencesreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LCV-5J6A]. 
 141. Racial data is recorded at its smallest level in census block groups that can be relatively 
large. Using census block groups to determine whether people of different race or ethnic groups 
are living inside or outside of an ETJ would be imprecise. For an example, see 2010 Census—
Census Block Map (Index): Alamance County, N.C., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www2.census.gov/geo/maps/dc10map/GUBlock/st37_nc/county/c37001_alamance/DC10
BLK_C37001_000.pdf [https://perma.cc/CK2B-XPCL]. 
 142. See UNC CTR. FOR CIV. RIGHTS, supra 140, at ii.  
 143. Id. 
 144. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-66 (2017) (describing the qualification for municipal elections 
that require residence within the municipal limits). 
 145. Lichter, supra note 12, at 59.  
 146. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58 (2017); id. 160A-58.1, amended by Act of June 30, 
2017, ch. 85, § 3.(b), 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 728, 729. 
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the twentieth century.147 The United States Supreme Court, for instance, 
reversed a town’s annexation in Gomillion v. Lightfoot148 because it 
determined that the town’s purpose was explicitly to exclude black citizens 
from becoming part of the town.149 
In reaction to Gomillion, and to further counteract this trend, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964150 contains a provision that requires the U.S. 
Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) approval for annexation across the South 
to prevent the dilution technique from being used; the DOJ, however, has 
rarely struck down an annexation.151 This was known as preclearance. In 
certain counties with a demonstrated history of segregation, certain policies 
that had discriminatory potential required preclearance. Now, DOJ 
preclearance is no longer required because Shelby County v. Holder152 
undercut this section of the Voting Rights Act.153 
Though infrequent, there are documented examples of established 
white communities having complete planning control over historically 
black communities but providing no services to those communities in 
return. In Silver City, which is a predominantly black community in Hoke 
County, North Carolina, all the planning decisions are made by the town of 
Raeford, a predominantly white community.154 Three black communities in 
the ETJ of Mebane, North Carolina, have been excluded from Mebane’s 
annexed growth while having to deal with the difficulties of urban 
 
 147. See PARNELL ET AL., supra note 137, at 1; see also Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities 
Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1104 
(2008) (citing Daniel T. Lichter et al., Municipal Underbounding: Annexation and Racial 
Exclusion in Small Southern Towns, 71 RURAL SOC. 47, 63–65 (2007)) (“Towns with 
predominantly white populations were much less likely to annex black unincorporated areas, even 
with statistical controls on the size of the black fringe population.”). 
 148. 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
 149. Id. at 347. 
 150. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 and 42 
U.S.C.).  
 151. See PARNELL ET AL., supra note 137, at 2–3. 
 152. 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
 153. See Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 529 (“It’s failure to act leaves us today with no choice 
but to declare § 4(b) unconstitutional. The formula in that section can no longer be used as a basis 
for subjecting jurisdictions to preclearance.”). For an example of how states have interpreted this, 
see TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, HANDBOOK FOR MAYORS AND COUNCILMEMBERS 31 (2017), 
https://www.tml.org/DocumentCenter/View/66/2017-Handbook-Mayors-Council-Members-PDF 
[https://perma.cc/QNS3-YWJZ] (providing an update from the Texas Municipal League advising 
their members that Section V preclearance is no longer required for annexations). 
 154. See PARNELL ET AL., supra note 137, at 5.  
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density.155 Monroe Town and Jackson Hamlet in Moore County are other 
examples.156 
Whether or not the decisions made by municipalities in annexing or 
extending ETJs are racially motivated, these annexation decisions 
sometimes end up having a racially disparate impact.157 ETJs are creating 
pockets of poverty that are harder to redevelop, and those affected by this 
policy in rural North Carolina are predominantly black. 
C. Disproportionate Concentration of Undesirable Land Uses in ETJs 
Pieces written about the negative effects of ETJ zoning often presume 
that undesirable land uses will be disproportionately concentrated in the 
ETJ area.158 The reasoning behind this presumption makes sense; incentives 
are aligned for town residents to push undesirable land uses outside of their 
borders while county residents will push those same land uses back towards 
the town to maintain the character of their communities.159 
But what are undesirable land uses? Typically, undesirable land uses 
are those that will have some sort of negative impact on the people living 
and working in the surrounding areas, including noise, odor, and light 
emissions, or simply displeasing to the eye.160 Some examples of 
undesirable land uses include power plants, heavy industry, waste water 
treatment plants, confined animal feeding operations, and adult 
entertainment.161 
It would not be surprising that some of these undesirable uses might 
end up congregated on the outskirts of an urban area—that is, in the ETJ—
considering that undesirable land uses are disproportionately sited in 
 
 155. See id. The ETJ communities surrounding Mebane, North Carolina, live at a density 
where septic systems are failing, resulting in contaminated well water and another section was 
rezoned to a manufacturing zoning class without ETJ resident input. Id. 
 156. See UNC CTR. FOR CIV. RIGHTS, supra note 140, at 1.  
 157. See generally Washington v. Davis 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that laws are 
constitutionally valid even if they have a racially disparate impact so long as the law was not 
passed with a racial animus). 
 158. See Anderson, supra note 147, at 1152–53 (“The risk that unincorporated areas will bear 
a disproportionate share of regional land-use burdens is compounded by the fact that many states 
have conferred extraterritorial powers on cities, an exception to the general rule that borders 
define the limits of local government authority.”).  
 159. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 133, at 77; see also Wheeler, supra note 133, at 243. 
 160. See Daniel Kevin, “Environmental Racism” and Locally Undesirable Land Uses: A 
Critique of Environmental Justice Theories and Remedies, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 121, 121 (1997) 
(listing hazardous waste facilities, solid waste disposal sites, and contaminated industrial sites as 
undesirable land uses).  
 161. See id.; Vanessa Zboreak, “Yes, in Your Backyard!” Model Legislative Efforts to 
Prevent Communities from Excluding CAFOs, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 147, 172 n.129 
(2015). 
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minority communities.162 Those in the urban setting might not want these 
uses to take up their valuable living space or pollute their quality of life. 
These urban residents could pressure their representatives (on the town 
council or the planning board) to focus development of necessary but 
sometimes harmful uses as far away from the urban center of living but still 
close enough to be useful to these residents.163 
County residents living outside of the ETJ will apply similar pressures 
for some of the uses.164 County residents often want to maintain the rural 
environment they enjoy and pressure their elected representatives on the 
board of county commissioners to push development of undesirable land 
uses towards the urban areas via county planning and development 
policies.165 
If these two pressures functioned as theorized, then all undesirable 
land uses should end up near the urban fringe with a good number falling in 
ETJs. 
However, the claim that political will is the sole determinant for siting 
undesirable land uses has not necessarily been borne out by research, likely 
given that data to assess this claim is not well documented. I sought to test 
this claim by pulling from public data sets, including: (1) wastewater 
treatment plants, (2) sewer water treatment plants, (3) fossil fuel burning 
power plants, (4) landfills, (5) major source of air pollution, and (6) 
industrial waste sites.166 Unfortunately, the existing databases are often 
incomplete or do not clearly or precisely identify the location of 
geographical and historical boundaries of undesirable land uses.167 The lack 
 
 162. See Kevin, supra note 160, at 123–25. 
 163. See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 133, at 243. 
 164. AM. PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 133, at 77. 
 165. See, e.g., HEATHER BALLASH, KEEPING THE RURAL VISION 23 (1999), 
http://mrsc.org/getmedia/2ff2491c-e490-49e8-9bb4-6c4aa197514d/RuralDevelopmentPlanning.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/6KFD-EY3H] (highlighting an example where rural residents “protect[ed] rural 
character”). 
 166. See, e.g., Active Permitted Landfills Map, N.C. ENVTL. QUALITY, 
https://deq.nc.gov/active-permitted-landfills-map [https://perma.cc/JMW7-S36H]; Inactive 
Hazardous Sites Map, N.C. ENVTL. QUALITY, https://deq.nc.gov/about/divisions/waste-
management/waste-management-rules-data/waste-management-gis-maps/ihs-map-viewer 
[https://perma.cc/763K-PG4Y]; Maps: Power Plants, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/maps/layer_info-m.php [https://perma.cc/T6F8-ERUR]; Sewer Treatment 
Plants, NC ONEMAP, http://data.nconemap.gov/geoportal/catalog/search/resource/
details.page?uuid=%7BF82748A9-C2D2-4B47-B570-BD55462BB6AE%7D [https://perma.cc/
7X8E-M9B9]; Water Distribution Treatment Plants, NC ONEMAP, http://data.nconemap.gov/
geoportal/catalog/search/resource/details.page?uuid=%7B96A2BD7C-48BA-4F84-9EE7-
1854C1BD0241%7D [https://perma.cc/FDU4-AVE6]. 
 167. See Active Permitted Landfills Map, supra note 166 (providing pinpoints of locations of 
permitted landfills but not their size or geographical boundaries); Inactive Hazardous Sites Map, 
supra note 166 (“Disclaimer: NC DEQ staff have compiled this dataset to the best of their 
abilities using the resources available to them. NC DEQ neither verifies nor guarantees the 
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of both data and research leave this theory as exactly that: a theory. In order 
to appropriately address the impact of ETJs on its residents, determining 
the answer behind the theory is important. Therefore, further research 
should focus on whether undesirable land uses are actually 
disproportionately located in ETJs. 
D. Provision of Services 
Because ETJ residents live under the control of two regulating 
groups—both the county and the town—the ETJ may be ignored by both 
the county and town governments because each believes that the other will 
take responsibility for the area.168 Because the powers of town governments 
and county governments might be listed in different ordinances, each town 
may not have the same powers available to it in the ETJ.169 This means 
there is no uniform determination of what power belongs to which entity.170 
This may not be a problem if the ETJ is to be annexed in the near 
future. Annexation laws (even prior to the 2011 and 2012 annexation 
reforms) require the town to provide the same municipal services to 
annexed areas that are provided within the city limits.171 One of the main 
services that is not commonly provided to ETJ residents is water and sewer 
services even though some ETJs have a density that makes sewer services a 
necessity.172 Dense communities that are zoned for future development but 
left in the ETJ, because the annexation statute no longer makes annexation 
economically feasible, might thus find themselves in a public health 
crisis.173 
 
accuracy, reliability, or completeness of any data provided. NC DEEQ provides this data without 
warranty of any kind whatsoever, either express or implied, and shall not be liable for incidental, 
consequential, or special damages arising out of the use of any data provided herein.”); see also 
Water Distribution Treatment Plants, supra note 166 (providing data of water distribution 
treatment plants gathered in 1997 and 2000). Although information about the current locations of 
ETJs is available for some counties, see, e.g., Download GIS Data, JOHNSTON COUNTY, N.C., 
http://www.johnstonnc.com/gis2/content.cfm?PD=data [https://perma.cc/ML9C-W3CU] 
(providing ETJ boundaries for Johnston County), existing databases do not have information for 
all counties. Furthermore, the imprecise locations of undesirable land uses and the fact that data 
for the locations of both ETJs and undesirable land uses are not available for the same time 
frames make drawing meaningful conclusions from these data sets very limited.  
 168. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 11.  
 169. See id. at 11 n.58.  
 170. See id. 
 171. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-58.56 (2017). 
 172. See PARNELL ET AL., supra note 137 (“This neighborhood [in Southern Pines’ ETJ] has 
neither water nor sewer. The residents petitioned Southern Pines for annexation in order to get 
water and sewer. Their request was denied.”); see also id. (highlighting that for involuntary 
annexations, municipalities must extend water and sewer lines within two years of annexation).  
 173. See, e.g., id (“Residents of White Level [a predominately black ETJ community] 
requested annexation in 1997 because of problems with their septic tanks, but the town took no 
action. Human fecal bacteria attributed to failing septic systems have been found in all three 
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Some areas that are outside of a town’s municipal boundary reach a 
population density that qualifies as urban under the U.S. Census.174 In the 
past, rural areas have typically been left to their own devices when it comes 
to water and sewer planning—often resulting in the use of private wells and 
septic tanks.175 But rural counties are finding themselves responsible for 
larger and denser populations than ever before and have begun providing 
water and sewer services to some parts of their communities in the same 
way a municipality would.176 
When a county chooses to provide water and sewer services, it might 
target unincorporated urban areas for cost and health reasons.177 However, 
when these unincorporated areas that might require sewer and water 
services are in a town’s ETJ, a county may choose to provide services in 
other areas because it erroneously believes that it is the responsibility of the 
town to provide for these areas.178 
There are several examples throughout the state of counties that 
provide water and sewer services for some densely populated areas, but the 
county cuts services off right at the ETJ.179 Similarly, the town will provide 
water and sewer within the city limits, but the services will not be provided 
in the ETJ.180 To illustrate this principle, I have examined data from the 
North Carolina OneMap service which completed a thorough study of the 
sewer system in each of North Carolina’s 100 counties, using data from 
2003. 181 
Outside of Goldsboro, North Carolina, Wayne County elected to 
provide sewer services to a census-defined urban area that lacked sewer 
services.182 Meanwhile, the town of Goldsboro provided sewer services 
 
neighborhoods.”); Purifoy, supra note 21 (showing how these situations can lead to “abandoned 
houses, substandard housing, . . . [and a] lack of water and sewer infrastructure”).  
 174. Anderson, supra note 147, at 1100; Smoothed Urban Boundary, NC ONEMAP, 
http://data.nconemap.gov/geoportal/catalog/search/resource/details.page?uuid=%7B552ED374-
BAAB-4F56-B369-DEB93F2E4ABF%7D [https://perma.cc/4QBD-AUN5].  
 175. See AM. PLANNING ASS’N, supra note 133, at 181, 191–92.  
 176. See id. at 181 (describing how suburban areas provide water and sewer services when 
on-site services become impossible). 
 177. See, e.g., Julia Marie Naman & Jacqueline MacDonald Gibson, Disparities in Water and 
Sewer Services in North Carolina: An Analysis of the Decision-Making Process, 105 AM. J. OF 
PUB. HEALTH e20, e22–e24 (2015), https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/pdf/
10.2105/AJPH.2015.302731 [https://perma.cc/2B9B-G3ZU] (describing the conflicts preventing 
a county from providing sewer service).  
 178. Id. 
 179. See, e.g., Type A Current Public Sewer Systems, NC ONEMAP GEOSPATIAL PORTAL 
http://data.nconemap.gov/geoportal/catalog/search/resource/details.page?uuid=%7B5CF6143E-
F6EA-4420-B18E-054415C3E108%7D [https://perma.cc/HZ4P-USXV]. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. See id. 
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within its boundaries and only to small pieces of the ETJ.183 Thus, large 
swaths of the Goldsboro ETJ that are considered urban by the census are 
not provided sewer services by either the town or the county.184 When and 
if the county next chooses to provide sewer service, it may not choose to do 
so in the ETJ because of the common belief that the ETJ will eventually be 
annexed so county resources would be better spent elsewhere.185 
In Nash County, North Carolina, which has a robust county sewer 
system, there are ETJ sections considered to be urban around both Rocky 
Mount and Nashville that do not receive county sewer services.186 Both 
Rocky Mount and Nashville provide sewer to their municipal residents, but 
this service stops right at the town line and does not extend into the ETJ.187 
Nash County does provide sewer services to some of the ETJ surrounding 
the towns of Bailey and Spring Hope; however, none of these towns or the 
ETJs qualify as urban by census standards and are in less need of these 
services than those not receiving it because each has not yet reached an 
urban density and could use wells and septic tanks rather than public water 
and sewer.188 
Of course, while there are visible examples of ETJ areas being ignored 
for the provision of services by both the municipality and the county, there 
are also some counties where urban areas within an ETJ are provided with 
water and sewer services.189 The town of Clayton, a suburb of Raleigh in 
Johnston County, has a substantial ETJ, a large portion of which is 
considered to be an urban area, and much of that area is provided with 
sewer services.190 
Because of the uncertainty over the future of ETJ areas, county 
governments may not want to spend money to provide water and sewer 
services to these communities because they do not know if their investment 
will be worth it in the long run.191 On the other hand, the longer a town 
waits to annex and provide services to an ETJ community that needs them, 
the worse the problems in the ETJ will become, making it increasingly less 
likely that an annexation will ever be initiated by the town considering that 
towns are allowed to take cost into consideration when making annexation 
decisions.192 
 
 183. See id. 
 184. See id. 
 185. See Naman & Gibson, supra note 177, at e21–e22. 
 186. See Type A Current Public Sewer Systems, supra note 179. 
 187. See id. 
 188. See id.  
 189. See id. 
 190. See id.  
 191. See Naman & Gibson, supra note 177, at e21–e22.  
 192. See id. at e21–e26.  
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III.  HOW CAN COMMUNITIES THAT NO LONGER WISH TO BE REGULATED 
BY A NEIGHBORING TOWN REMEDY THEIR SITUATION? 
While there does not seem to be a single issue plaguing every ETJ in 
the state, there are situations where communities are denied water and 
sewer services despite density and where the town’s refusal to annex is 
racially motivated.193 A solution must be provided for those who are stuck 
in planning limbo. The instinctive answer to an unincorporated urban 
community is to have the town annex the community so that it must 
provide services. But annexation may not be the appropriate solution in all 
or even most situations. 
A. Existing Solutions 
1.  Annexation 
If the primary concern is lack of necessary services—whether because 
it causes a lower standard of living or because it prevents the future 
economic development of the area194—annexation might be the appropriate 
solution. This tool may in some ways be even more feasible in the wake of 
recent policy reforms. 
With the changes to the annexation statute making involuntarily 
annexation of a property more expensive, the likelihood that communities 
in need of services will be annexed at the town’s volition has decreased.195 
However, the Annexation Reform Act of 2011 did create a method for 
contiguous communities to demand annexation into a municipality, after 
which it is required by law for the town to provide services to these new 
residents in the same capacity as all other residents.196 
However, a community that wishes to be annexed will need to put in 
significant work to make it happen. The current annexation statute allows 
an adjacent economically distressed area to force annexation by presenting 
the municipality with a petition signed by seventy-five percent of the 
landowners in that area.197 Seventy-five percent of property owners may 
seem like a daunting obstacle, but there is neither an area nor a population 
 
 193. See generally UNC CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra 140, at 1, 12–13, 29 (chronicling the 
effects of municipal underbounding on minority communities across the state).  
 194. See Naman & Gibson, supra note 177, at e20 (citing UNC CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 
supra note 140, at 1–29) (“In addition to health concerns, well and septic system users cite stench, 
decreased property value, and high repair costs as adverse effects of relying on self-supplied 
systems.”).  
 195. See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text. 
 196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31 (2017), amended by Act to Reform the Involuntary 
Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1667–70. 
 197. Id. § 160A-31(b1), amended by Act to Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of 
North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1667–70.  
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requirement, so very small areas could force annexation by providing 
petitions with as few as one signature. For example, a single landowner 
who owns land abutting the town boundary that has a household income 
below the maximum threshold could, in theory, petition the town for 
annexation, and the town would have no choice but to oblige. 
Of course, this solution is not perfect. The difficulties of community 
organizing and the likelihood of getting such a high percentage of 
signatures when annexation might result in higher property taxes could 
make these types of annexations difficult to achieve. The most democratic 
aspect of this new mechanism to trigger annexation allows the residents—
rather than landowners—to petition for annexation into a municipality. 
From a public health perspective, residents will be the ones who are feeling 
the effects from lack of services, especially sewer and water services, 
where population density might be causing contamination of their water. 
While the categories of property owners and residents will often overlap, 
this is less and less common.198 
Even in the face of a public health concern, property owners who are 
not residents may be reluctant to sign a petition that will increase their 
property taxes because they will now be taxed by the municipality as well 
as the county. But a petition signed by residents rather than property 
owners has no compulsory effect; rather it gives the town the option to 
annex the property, not dissimilar to the option the town had before the 
annexation reforms were ever presented.199 
Property owners may be willing to sign the petition if annexation is 
desired to stabilize future economic development by assuring access not 
only to town services like sewer and water but also law enforcement or fire 
services. Residents—unlike property owners—may be wary of more 
investment in the community because it may lead to higher housing costs. 
However, even if all landowners and residents in a community wish to be 
annexed into a municipality to gain services, this new mechanism is 
available only in defined economically distressed areas where fifty-one 
 
 198. Millennials (adults currently under forty) are buying homes at rates lower than any 
previous generation and are choosing to rent rather than own either because of employment 
uncertainty or from lack of access to sufficient credit. See Aaron Hankin, The Real Reasons 
Millennials Aren’t Buying Homes, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 29, 2018), 
https://www.investopedia.com/news/real-reasons-millennials-arent-buying-homes/ 
[https://perma.cc/33S9-H6PJ]. 
 199. Compare N.C. GEN STAT. § 160A-31(a), with id. § 160A-31(j), amended by Act to 
Reform the Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 
1649, 1667–70. 
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percent of residents in households in the area wishing to be annexed have 
an income less than 200 percent of the federal poverty level.200 
For areas that do not meet these criteria but wish to avail themselves 
of municipal services, their only other option is to ask the municipality to 
initiate an involuntary annexation. Due to the costs the city would have to 
incur, this option is unlikely to succeed. 
2.  Representation 
Of course, annexation is not always the solution for landowners who 
simply want more control over their own property. Other possible remedies 
include more direct representation or setting temporal limits on the control 
that a municipality can exercise over its ETJ. 
As the law currently stands, the planning board or board of adjustment 
must have proportional representation from residents of the ETJ.201 The 
members are appointed by the board of county commissioners rather than 
elected by the people of the ETJ whom they will be representing. 
Appointed representation historically made sense because planning board 
members are usually not elected officials, except in the case where the 
town council is serving as the planning board.202 
Electing the member who supposedly represents the interest of the 
ETJ residents is a simple solution to the problem of representation on the 
boards who decide the fate of ETJs. 
Planning boards are composed in any way the community organizing 
the board sees fit,203 possibly meaning that towns and counties could 
implement this solution without waiting for the General Assembly to pass a 
statute. Though unconventional to elect only one member of the planning 
board while the rest of the board is appointed by the town council, it might 
be necessary to ensure that these decisionmaking bodies actually have the 
interests of their constituents at heart. In the grand scheme of things, it may 
simultaneously be better to push these representative boards towards being 
 
 200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-31(b1) (2017), amended by Act to Reform the Involuntary 
Annexation Laws of North Carolina, ch. 396, § 10, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1667–70. 
 201. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State, 
ch. 111, § 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws —, — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-3-1), 
https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/SessionLaws/PDF/2019-2020/SL2019-111.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V8YJ-9ZGR]; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-361 (2017), repealed by Act to 
Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 
N.C. Sess. Laws at —.  
 202. See Lovelady, supra note 129.  
 203. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State 
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-3-1); see also N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 160A-361(a) (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the 
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
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more democratic rather than less. While there are no guarantees that the 
person elected would have the best interests of every ETJ representative in 
mind, with a relatively small voting population it may be possible for a 
normally marginalized population to have a stronger voice than it may in 
large town elections. 
When town residents are displeased by the decisions of the planning 
boards, they have the political option to vote in their town elections to elect 
new town board members who are responsible for appointing the members 
of the planning boards.204 ETJ residents, by contrast, do not have any 
political action they can take other than speaking at public meetings or 
writing to representatives who might not even consider ETJ residents to be 
their constituents because they cannot vote in municipal elections.205 
B. Proposed Solutions 
Simply having a representative on the planning board never truly 
solved the representation problem. Because many planning board decisions 
are subject to approval by the town board or town council, ETJ residents 
remain without meaningful representation on the board of final decision.206 
Additionally, many smaller municipalities do not have standing planning 
boards or board of adjustments, but rather form ad hoc committees for each 
request that does not fit within the exact letter of the current zoning 
ordinance.207 
To fully compensate for the lack of representation of ETJ residents in 
the planning process, there needs to be a statutory mechanism that requires 
municipalities to consider the needs of their ETJ communities. 
I propose that this could be done effectively in three different ways: 
1.  Require ETJ Justification or Rationale 
First, the legislature could require that, in every decision the planning 
board makes, it must consider and document the effects that the decision 
will have on the ETJ. However, this would be a persuasive measure with no 
real “teeth.”208 The purpose is to force the decisionmakers to remember that 
 
 204. Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State 
§ 2.4, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at — (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160D-3-1); see also N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 160A-361(a) (2017), repealed by Act to Clarify, Consolidate, and Reorganize the 
Land–Use Regulatory Laws of the State § 2.2, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws at —. 
 205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-66 (2017) (describing the qualification for municipal elections 
that require residence within the municipal limits). 
 206. Lovelady, supra note 129. 
 207. See supra notes 143–45 and accompanying text.  
 208. Persuasive legislation aims to “change people’s behavior by forcing them to think about 
the harm they are causing and by publicizing that harm.” James Salzman, Teaching Policy 
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decisions regarding planning and development will have an impact on the 
ETJ. Hopefully, the decisionmakers will remember that the residents of the 
ETJ have no independent means to counter any of the negative planning 
impacts on their own. For example, Brunswick County, North Carolina, 
requires any municipality that plans to exercise its ETJ to justify it.209 
2.  Require ETJ Reevaluation 
Second, the statute could mandate reevaluation of the town’s ETJ at 
regular intervals. I propose that municipalities be required to reevaluate and 
justify their zoning and planning jurisdiction over the ETJ every five years. 
This could simply consist of a meeting where the planning staff has 
prepared a report about the development status of the land within the ETJ 
and whether it is being used effectively to serve the residents of that area. A 
majority of responding municipalities in the UNC School of Government 
report stated that most considered the ETJ to be a tool prior to future 
annexation.210 Annexation has become more difficult after the land reform 
bills of 2011 and 2012.211 Therefore, any report about the current status of 
an ETJ area should include an update on plans to incorporate ETJ areas into 
their borders and an estimated timeline for this happening. 
The planning board should be required to give compelling justification 
for retaining planning and development jurisdiction over an area that does 
not receive the benefit of town services aside from the proximity to 
municipal services. A ten-year timeline would allow the town ample time 
to consider long-term planning goals while ensuring that the residents and 
landowners are not indefinitely held in an uncertain position. Prior to the 
public meeting where the ETJ is being reevaluated, public notice should be 
given to both residents and land owners in the ETJ by requiring mailings to 
every residence and, if different, the tax bill address for each residence to 
make sure that both residents and property owners are able to give their 
opinion on staying in the ETJ, being released from the ETJ, or potentially 
petitioning for certain areas to be annexed. 
Further, at the meeting and in the mailings, the statute should require 
the planning board to provide information to the residents and property 
 
Instrument Choice in Environmental Law: The Five P’s, 23 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 363, 373 
(2013) (citing Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (1995)). 
 209. OWENS, EXPERIENCE, supra note 16, at 13 (“Brunswick County requires each 
municipality requesting extraterritorial jurisdiction to explain its concerns about the area and to 
demonstrate its capability and qualifications to provide land use planning, infrastructure planning, 
and development regulations in the area.”). 
 210. See id. at 10. 
 211. See supra Sections I.D–E.  
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owners about the annexation statutes and the ability of these residents or 
land owners to request or force annexation via petition. 
To make sure this decision is taken seriously, the statute should 
include a private right of action for residents and land owners granting 
them standing to challenge the decision made at this regular reevaluation of 
the ETJ. Any resident or land owner in the ETJ should have the ability to 
challenge the decision made on the grounds that it was unreasonable and, if 
the Superior Court agrees,212 to force the planning staff and board to give 
more sound reasoning for their decision or possibly reverse it—whether 
this decision was to abandon the planning of a property or to retain 
planning jurisdiction even when it is not justifiably relevant to the 
development of the municipality itself. 
The above solutions apply to areas that are already within the ETJ of a 
municipality. A prophylactic measure to prevent areas that do not wish to 
become part of a municipality’s planning jurisdiction may also be required. 
3.  Referendum Requirement 
Like the annexation reform passed in 2011,213 the General Assembly 
could provide a referendum mechanism that allows residents to prevent a 
municipality from extending its planning jurisdiction further than it is 
currently extended. This would give the residents a chance to prevent 
problems potentially caused by the imposition of an ETJ by retaining land 
development and planning authority within their elected body, that is, the 
county board of commissioners. 
This simple change would align with the property rights values of 
independence and self-determination that led to the annexation reform in 
the first place and would prevent unincorporated communities from being 
left in planning limbo where they will be forever regulated by a 
municipality that never intends to annex them into the municipality. 
The statute could require towns to hold a referendum for all ETJ 
residents before the town is allowed to exercise its ETJ power over a new 
area. If a majority of voters rejected the expansion of the ETJ in the 
referendum, then the town could not exercise its ETJ. 
 
 212. See generally DAVID W. OWENS, REVIEW OF LAND USE DECISIONS 5–6 (2017), 
https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/course_materials/06%20Review%20of%20
Land%20Use_Owens.pdf [https://perma.cc/FHX4-G7MY] (“[T]he superior court is limited to 
review of whether the board [of adjustment] properly affirmed or overruled the officer’s 
determination.”). 
 213. Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 396, § 1, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1649, 1649–71 (codified as 
amended at N.C. GEN . STAT. §§ 160A-58.50 to -58.63 (2017)). 
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CONCLUSION 
The use of ETJs does not always result in hardship for the residents or 
property owners of an area on the outskirts of town. Many subdivision 
residents who moved into neighborhoods with private trash and sewer 
services view residence in a municipal zoning jurisdiction as an asset, 
believing it will prevent unwanted land uses in their neighborhoods while 
not subjecting them to municipal property taxes. 
Although most ETJs burden communities in some ways, the burden 
type is not the same across the board. Some may simply feel burdened by a 
lack of elected representation. Other communities, especially communities 
that are predominately Black or poor, may notice that they are excluded 
from town boundaries but are still required to go to the municipality 
whenever they want to do something with their own property. 
Data shows municipalities that use the tool responsibly to plan for 
growth and to promote orderly development on the outskirts of towns 
benefit town residents and those living in the ETJ. However, it cannot be 
denied that this is a tool that can and has been used improperly and there 
should be more options for residents that wish to have more direct control 
over their land use planning decisions. 
Residents who are stuck in planning and development limbo in the 
ETJ of a town that is no longer growing may be ignored in planning and 
development decisions. The ETJ may be seen as a convenient area that the 
town can zone to develop for the benefit of town residents while ignoring 
the effects that it will have on ETJ residents and remaining politically 
insulated from the effects of their decision because those ETJ residents are 
not able to express their disapproval of town officials at the ballot box. 
A simple change to the ETJ statute requiring towns to justify the 
exercising of their extraterritorial zoning power every five years would 
give ETJ residents a specific time to air their grievances to town officials 
which could give ETJ residents a decision that they could challenge in 
court as arbitrary and capricious. 
When it comes down to it, towns rely on ETJ residents and property 
owners to work and shop in their towns almost as much as they do their 
own residents and should not be able to take advantage of the fact that ETJ 
residents have no political recourse when making planning and zoning 
decisions on their behalf. 
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